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Sentencing: The Use of Psychiatric
Information and Presentence Reports
By RUTEEFORD B. CAMPBELL, J1.*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 16th Century legal literature an author observed
that "many books have appeared in which sorcery is con-
sidered not a crime but a superstition and a melancholy, and
these [writers] insist violently that it should not be punished
by death. The [reasonings of Dr. Weyer, however,] are not
very important, for he is a physician and not a jurist."'
It has become apparent that the two disciplines of law and
psychiatry have a common "interface" in the field of criminal
justice.' Commentators generally agree that the administration
of criminal justice is greatly aided by psychiatrists and psychiatric
data.' That is not to say, however, that the meeting of the dis-
ciplines has been without incident or misunderstanding.' Prob-
lems have arisen because of divergent attitudes and goals of the
professions. Some commentators say that the concerns of the two
disciplines are not the same;5 others claim that much of the
*Assistant Professor of Law at the University of South Carolina School of
Law. J.D., University of Kentucky (1969). LL.M. Harvard University Law School
(1971).
1 W. Burger, Psychiatrists, Lawyers, and the Courts, 28 Fed. Prob. 3 (1964)
(quoting from G. Zilboorg, A History of Medical Psychiatry 233 (1941) [herein-
after cited as Burger].
2 Comment, The Psychiatrist's Role in Determining Accountability For Crimes:
The Public Anxiety and an Increasing Expertise, 52 MAnQ. L. REv. 380 (1969).
3 But see, M. Nord, The Mental Element in Crime, 37 U. DET. L. J. 671, 679
(1960).
Under this theory, criminal law is irrelevant. Psychiatrists are relevant.
Criminals are sick, and are captive patients of psychiatrists who are well. No one
is convicted of being a criminal; he is merely a grown-up juvenile delinuent. Why
vorry about such formalities as "burden of proof," "due process of law,' and "jury
trial'? A little treatment by "scientific- type" psychiatrists will cure everything.
... This will all be very well if the psychiatrists are as gifted as they think they
are, but what if they should turn out to be as confused as they seem to be?
4 See generally, L. Roberts, Some Observations on the Problems of the
Forensic Psychiatrist, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 240.
DId. at 242-43, wherein the author states:
Part of the inter-professional barrier relates to this relative concern for
the alleged offender by each profession. Psychiatry is concerned with
(Continued on next page)
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problem lies in the over-estimation of the certainty and reliability
of psychiatric information;6 while still others believe that the use
of the psychiatrist to assess criminal responsibility involves the
psychiatrist in "legal, philosophical and moral considerations,
clearly outside his scope."7
While many of the problems' raised by commentators are
present at all stages of the criminal proceeding, at least some
writers feel that the psychiatrist can make his most important
contribution at the dispositional (i.e., sentencing) stage9 of the
action, after the guilt of the defendant has been determined.'0
It is felt by these commentators that the psychiatrist is better able
to function with respect to predictions of dangerousness at the
dispositional stage of a proceeding.:1 It would seem that at least
the psychiatrist would be less involved in the kinds of value
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
the individual, his evaluation and treatment. Law is more basically con-
cerned with the protection of society and the rehabilitation of the ad-judged offender.But the author goes on to point out that in the long run, these goals may be closer
than they seem. Hee fu ermadds, however, that the approaches are "radically
different."
6 M. Schmideberg, The Promise of Psychiatry: Hopes and Disillusionment, 57
Nw. U.L. REv. 19, 20 (1962).
In the last twenty years, we have been subjected to such a barrage of
indiscriminate and often irresponsible glorification of psychiatry, largely
by popular press, that some of the fundamental issues have been ob-
scnured.
The intelligent public has the right to know that, today, psychiatry
is in ferment-many concepts, held for decades to be firmly established,
are being increasingly challenged, and fundamental divergencies are
developing amongst its leading exponents on almost every issue of psy-
chiatric diagnosis, therapy and prophylactic recommendation. This holds
true to an even greater degree for legal psychiatry. Id. at 21.
7 J. Suarez, A Critique of the Psychiatrist's Role as an Expert Witness, 12 J.
FoR. Scr. 172, 174 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Suarez].
8 It should be noted that the above issues are merely illustrative of the prob-
lems raised by commentators. It is by no means intended to be exhaustive.
9Throughout this paper I shall use the terms "dispositional stage of a trial"
and "sentencing stage of a trial" interchangeably. These terms are used to mean
that part of the trial which takes place after the determination of the defendant's
guilt and in which the sentencing judge determines whether the defendant should
be probated or sentenced, and if sentenced, how long a term he should serve.
10 E.g., L. Friedman, No Psychiatry in Criminal Court, 56 A.B.A.J. 242 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Friedman]. Other writers have indirectly agreed with the
proposition that the psychiatrist can make his most valuable contribution at the
dispositional stage by recommending a bifurcated trial, at the first stage of which
the court would determine the physical commission of the act. At the second stage
the court would determine disposition, and at this stage the court would consider
psychiatric data. Burger, supra note 1.
11 Friedman, supra note 10; R. Waelder, Psychiatry and the Problem of Crimi-
nal Responsibility, 101 U. PA. L. Rmv. 378, 389 (1952) [hereinafter cited as
Waelder].
SENTENCING
judgments implicit in a determination of criminal responsibility
so troublesome to Dr. Suarez.'2
But even at the dispositional stage of the proceedings, the use
of psychiatric information presents many problems. It is the pur-
pose of this paper to explore the problems encountered by the use
of psychiatric information at the dispositional stage of a criminal
trial and to demonstrate that a procedure adequate to protect the
constitutional rights of the defendant when the ordinary-type
presentence report (containing only factual background informa-
tion, past crimes, opinions of friends, relatives, and employers as
to attitudes and character of defendant, etc.)' 3 is used by the
court is not necessarily adequate when psychiatric information is
included in the report.14 In this context it is assumed that the
psychiatric information is obtained by a court appointed psychi-
atrist. Further, although there will be a brief discussion of
mechanics of gathering pertinent information about the defen-
dant, this article will generally be divorced of any discussion of
the legal problems encountered in the gathering of such infor-
mation.' 5 Instead the attention shall be directed to a consideration
of the defendant's right to due process and the equitable balancing
of the rights of the defendant and society when psychiatric
information is used to determine the disposition of a convicted
offender.
II. Tim EVOLUnTON OF MoDERN SENTENciNG TImORY
In Williams v. New York,"' Justice Black indicated that indi-
12 Suarez, supra note 7. See also Waelder, supra note 11, at 385.
For a discussion of the contents and use a presentence report see p. 299
infra.i141 wish to make clear at the outset that the line which I draw between
psychiatric data and the rest of the information contained in the presentence report
is not intended to be a line separating two, all-inclusive categories. It is possible
that there are other types of information having characteristics that would make it
more analogous to psychiatric data. I merely use the two categories to demonstrate
that there are separate considerations which must be analyzed in the two types of
information.
15 There are a number of other problems involved in the gathering of psy-
chiatric information from a defendant, such as whether the defendant can he forced
to submit to a psychiatric examination against his will, whether the defendant has
the right to counsel during such an examination, etc. For a good discussion of
whether a defendant has a right to refuse a psychiatric examination see F. Dan-
forth, Death Knell for Pre-Trial Mental Examination? Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 19 RtrrGEms L. REv. 489 (1965); Note, Requiring A Criminal De-
fendant to Submit to a Government Psychiatric Examination: An Invasion of the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 83 HAv. L. REv. 648 (1970).
16 337 U.S. 241 (1948).
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vidualization of punishment for the same crime was not the
acceptable norm in earlier periods:
... [M]odern concepts individualizing punishment have made
it all the more necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied
an opportunity to obtain pertinent information....
• . . The belief no longer prevails that every offense in a like
legal category calls for an identical punishment without regard
to the past life and habits of a particular offender. This whole
country has traveled far from the period in which the death
sentence was an automatic and commonplace result of convic-
tions-even for offenses today deemed trivial.17
At early common law penalties for felonies were fixed.' S Black-
stone described it as one of the glories of the law. 9 Not only
were the penalties fixed for the various crimes, but it also appears
that from the reigns of Henry III and Edward I that death was the
punishment for all felonies except petty larceny and mayhem. 0
That is not to say, however, that each person convicted of a
felony was put to death. Judges sometimes engaged in various
practices-such as the benefit of clergy and transportation2 1-
which would save the defendant from death. Thus, even in this
early period, the judge had some minimal amount of discretion.
The nineteenth century saw a dramatic switch from the
position that the trial judge had no discretion in imposing sen-
17 Id. at 247-48.
18For a good discussion of the development of sentencing theory see Note,
Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 HAv. L. Btv. 821-25
(1968).
Judges did have discretion with regard to sentencing in misdemeanor cases.
S. RumN, THE LAW OF CRrMINAL CORRECTIONS 23 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
RuBN].
19W. BLACKSTONE, ComMENTAr Es ch. 29, 378 (Lewis ed. 1897). Black-
stone defended his stand as follows:
For, if judgements were to be the private opinions of the judge, men
would then be slaves to their magistrates, and would live in society with-
out knowing exactly the conditions and obligations which it lays them
under. And besides, as this prevents oppression on the one hand, so on
the other it stifles all hopes of impunity or mitigation with which an
offender might flatter himself, if his punishment depended on the humor
or discretion of the court.
20 1 J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CnIIuNAL LAw OF ENGLAND 458 (1883); F.
Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View from Mempa
v. Rhay, 47 TEXAs L. BEv. 1, 17-18 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Cohen].
21 For a good general discussion of these discretionary devices see Cohen,
supra note 20, at 18-19. See also RUBIN, supra note 18, at 17-18, 20-21 for a dis-
cussion of the practice of benefit of clergy (by which clergy, and later others,
could avoid the criminal penalties) and the practice of transportation (by which
convicted persons were pardoned on the condition that they be transported abroad,
usually to the colonies); see also J. HALL, TH Er, LAw A" Socxir 68-72 (1935)
for a discussion of benefit of clergy and transportation.
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tence,2 as reforms gave judges wide discretion in the imposition
of sentences.3 The shift, although not immediate, was substantial.
In the United States, not only do judges often have wide dis-
cretion as to the quantum of the sentence (including usually the
right to probate the defendant), 24 but there are also virtually no
procedural requirements,25 "no statutory guidance for judges, and,
except for a few jurisdictions, no appellate review of sentences."26
This shift, investing discretion in the sentencing judge, was at
least an opportunity, if not a directive, for the individualization
of sentencing. If individualization of sentencing means that per-
sons who commit the same crime should not necessarily receive
the same punishment, there must be some criteria, other than the
specific crime committed, upon which to base the sentence.
Otherwise, the imposition of a sentence may very well be as
arbitrary-or perhaps even more so-as when conviction for a
felony meant a mandatory death penalty. This leads to the fol-
lowing question: What are the objectives to be attained by a
sentence?
Most commentators agree that the objectives of an enlightened
sentencing philosophy are three: (1) deterrence; (2) neutrali-
zation; (3) rehabilitation. It is relevant to note that this at best
can be called a majority view of sentencing philosophy, since
various commentators disagree with the above categories.
28
2 2 
It is interesting to note that even before any formal shift in the law, there
arose a discrepancy between the policy of the legislature, which had increased the
number of capital crimes, and those who administered these laws. This manifested
itself in a sharp decrease in the number and percentage of convicted felons who
were executed. L. RADznxowicz, A HIsToRY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND rrs
ADzNISTRATION s Rom 1750, 158 (1948).
23 G. Pugh & H. Carver, Due Process and Sentencing: From Mapp to Mempa
to McGautha, 49 Tx. L. REv. 25, 27 (1970).24 E.g., in Kentucky involuntary manslaughter is punishable by imprisonment
of from one to fifteen years, KY. REv. STAT. hereinafter cited as KRS] § 435.022
(1962); maiming is punishable by imprisonment of from one to five years, KRS
§435.160 (1962).
25 See Williams v. New York, 887 U.S. 241, 246-47 (1948), where Justice
Black discusses the inapplicability of the rules of evidence at the sentencing stage
of a trial.26 Cohen, supra note 20, at 19. See generally, G. Mueller, Penalogy on Appeal:
Review of Legal but Excessive Sentences, 15 VAN. L. REv. 671 (1962) for a dis-
cussion of appellate review of sentences and the states which allow it.2 7 Note, Sentencing: The Good, The Bad and The Enlightened, 57 Ky. LJ.
456, 457-59 (1969). The author of this paper was the co-author of that note in
the Kentucky Law Journal. I have, therefore, felt at liberty to substantially
retrace what was said in that note concerning sentencing philosophy [hereinafter
cited as Note].
28For a discussion of the various philosophies of sentencing see Mueller,
Punishment, Correction, and the Law, 45 NEB. L. REv. 58, 65-83 (1966).
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Deterrence "simply refers to the prospect.., of pain as a psy-
chological stimulus posited by society in anticipation of the
response of abstension from gaining illicit pleasure...."2 9 Within
the category of deterrence, there are two sub-categories:
(1) special deterrence, aimed at the specific offender and
based upon the assumption that the inflicted punishment will
deter the particular offender who has received the punishment
from repeating the proscribed act; (2) general deterrence,
aimed at the populace and based upon the assumption that the
threat of punishment will provide a stimulus for the general
public to abstain from the commission of the act.30
Another aim of any sentence should be neutralization. This is
based on an "incapacitating effect:" that the removal of one from
society prevents repetition of his deviant act during the period of
his absence. "Naturally, the principle of utility would dictate that
solely as far as neutralization is concerned, no more force should
be employed than is necessary for preventive purpose. That means
also that restraint should last no longer than the danger emanating
from the restrained person persists."31
Finally, there should be a rehabilitative effect on the con-
victed individual. This argument "suggests that the criminal is
sick.., and therefore needs treatment.... "3
The above discussion makes clear two problems. First, ar-
riving at a rational sentence requires a weighing of the above
factors which means that in choosing an appropriate penalty, one
should balance the need for general deterrence (which would
seem to favor harsher sentence) 33 against the other objectives
such as rehabilitation and special deterrence (which may favor
probation of the defendant). Second, the proper consideration of
these objectives requires information about the convicted 4 in
29Id. at 74.
3 0 Note, supra note 27, at 458. The concept of general deterrence has come
under much fire from writers as to the morality of inflicting punishment based on
an attempt to deter others. See, e.g. Bittner & Platt, The Meaning of Punishment,
2 IssuEs iN CR1IMNOLOGY 89, 93 (1966). But see Andennaes, The Morality of
Deterrence, 37 U. Cm. L. Rtv. 649 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Andennaes].3 1 Mueller, supra note 28, at 74.
32&Gerbe& McAnany, Punishment: Current Survey of Philosophy and the
Law, 11 Sr. Louis U.L.J 491 498 (1967).
33 Some modem" writers have questioned whether there is any general deter-
rence as a result of the threat of criminal sanctions. See the discussion in Waelder,
supra note 11; see also the discussion in Andennaes, supra note 30.
(Continued on next page)
[Vol. 60
SENTENCING
order to determine the length of sentence necessary to effect
neutralization, rehabilitation and special deterrence. In essence
more information than that which is revealed at trial is required."3
III. DEvIcES FOR GATHERB G INFORMATION
To BE USED AT DiSPOsrTON
To fill the above informational requirement, many jurisdic-
tions have developed the presentence report as a vehicle to bring
before the sentencing judge relevant data concerning the de-
fendant.3 6 This presentence report is typically a report prepared
by the probation service37 before the sentence is imposed and
contains background information about the defendant. It usually
includes information such as the defendant's prior criminal record,
his religion, education, employment and finances, interests and
activities, physical and mental health, and his attitudes and per-
sonality.38 This report would seem of undisputed value to any
judge attempting to assess a penalty in conformity with the ob-
jectives of sentencing.3 9
An obvious flaw in any report prepared by a probation officer
is that it would normally lack psychiatric data concerning the
defendant.40 To fill this void, some jurisdictions have instituted a
system of psychiatric court clinics, which make available to the
court psychiatric facilities. Because of the potential importance
of the court clinics as a source of psychiatric information a brief
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
34 See Levine, Toward a More Enlightened Sentencing Procedure, 45 NEB. L.
REv. 499 (1966) wherein he states:
A just sentence will reflect the divergent backgrounds and present
circumstances of each individual offender, his present attitudes, and the
nature of the offending act itself.
35 See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). It is important to note
that most defendants (about 80% to 90%) plead guilty and therefore do not have a
trial. Pugh & Carver, supra note 23, at 26. Thus there may be no information on
which tobase a sentence.
36 E.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c) (1) & (2). In the state courts the requirement
for a presentence report varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. E.g., CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1203 (1966 Supp.) requires a presentence report for each felony conviction
where defendant is eligible for parole; MmN. STAT. ANN. § 609.115(1) makes the
use of the presentence report discretionary.3 7 E.g., FrD. R. Ctm. P. 32(c)(1); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2951.03 (1965
Supp.).
3sLehrich, The Use and Disclosure of Presentence Reports in the United
States, 47 F.R.D. 225, 228 (1969) (citing Keve, The Probation Officer Investigates
(1960)).39 See the discussion supra pp. 8-10.
40 The presentence report may contain psychiatric data if the defendant has
(Continued on next page)
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description of the functioning of one such clinic-the Massa-
chusetts Court Clinic-will be presented.4'
Briefly, the psychiatric court clinics are located in the court-
house and are staffed by social workers and psychiatrists. The
breadth of the Clinic System in Massachusetts is reflected by the
fact that in 1969 the twenty separate clinics saw over 4,200
individual cases,42 or about 5% of all defendants.43 One aspect
of the Massachusetts clinics which seems a bit curious is that
only one of the twenty clinics functions at the Superior Court
level, which generally handles the more serious felonies.44 It
would seem that there would be a greater need for psychiatric
information in disposing of these more serious offenses.
The basic purpose of the court clinics is "to provide diagnostic
and treatment services within courts, with the clinical services
located in the court house and in a close working relationship with
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
been given an examination to determine his competence to stand trial or his
criminal responsibility. But the use of such data may raise constitutional issues.
In United States v. Driscoll, 899 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1968) the court held it was
unfair to allow a psychiatrist who had examined the defendant to determine his
competency to stand trial to testify as to defendant's criminal responsibility,
where defendant had not been warned that the information may be used at the trial.
Although the issue in that case was somewhat different, the reasoning of the court
may be applicable to the issue at hand.
For a good discussion of the Driscoll case see Comment, Psychiatrist Who
Conducted Pre-Trial Competency Examination May Not Testify on Issues of
Mental Responsibility Unless Defendant is Notified of this Possibility Prior to
Examination, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1243 (1968).41 Psychiatric court clinics are not unique to Massachusetts. See, e.g., Hart-
man, Social Issues and the Court Psychiatric Clinic, 33 Fed. Prob. 37 (1969) where
the author discusses the clinics in Chicago.42 Department of Mental Health Division of Legal Medicine Court Clinic
Program, Annual Report (1969).
43 Russell, Massachusetts Court Clinics: A Study of its Administration and
Community Aspects, 1970 INTERNATioNAL JouRNAL OF OFFENDER THERAPY 140
(from a reprint) [hereinafter cited as Russell).
Dr. Russell goes on to state that "... [B]oth Court and clinic personnel affirm
the usefulness, in the remaining 95 percent of the cases, of the concepts learned
by the court from clinic cases." Id. at 142.44 In Massachusetts the Superior Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all
felonies with penalties of over 5 years, and concurrent jurisdiction with the District
Court over all felonies punishable by imprisonment for not more than 5 years.
MAss. CODE ANN., ch. 218 § 26 (1966); MAss. CODE ANN., ch. 212 § 6 (1966).
The District Court has general jurisdiction over lesser offenses. MAss. CODE ANN.,
ch. 218 § 26 (1966).
One possible explanation is that the District Court also has jurisdiction over
juveniles. MASS. CODE ANN. ch. 218 § 26 (1966). One author has justified this on
the grounds that the offenders dealt with by the Superior Court are "frequently
either ineligible or too dangerous for probation." Wolf, Legal Psychiatry and
Criminal Justice: The Court Clinic in Massachusetts, 12 J. FOR. Scr. 147, 161
(1967).
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court personnel."45 In a Court Clinic bulletin the Director of the
Program stated what he considered to be the functions of the
clinic as follows:
1. To assist the Court, upon referral, in presentence investiga-
tion by providing a psychiatric study of the case.
2. To provide psychiatric treatment within the court setting
for certain cases.
3. To be of assistance to probation officers in their work with
probationers.
4. To provide psychiatric examinations in cases where com-
mitment to mental hospital is under consideration by the
court.
4 6
Of the above, it is the first function (to assist the Court in the
presentence investigation) that is of primary interest here.
It has been estimated that about 80% of all cases referred to
the Superior Court Clinic are referred for the purpose of providing
psychiatric data for dispositional purposes.47 The determination
of which cases should go to the clinic for a pre-disposition psychi-
atric examination is a decision made by the judge. 48 It is impos-
sible to articulate and set criteria for determining which defendant
is afforded an examination under the Massachusetts program. The
most that can be said is that after seeing the probation report, and
based on it and other factors about the defendant, the judge may,
at his discretion, order the defendant to be examined by the court
clinic.49 Dr. Russell, the Director of the Court Clinics has stated
that referral may be appropriate where "questions arise which
require a more definitive inquiry into the offender's personality-
his motives, his inner conflicts, his capacity for self control, or his
latent character assets, and also the question of his need for
psychiatric treatment .... ",50
There are a number of advantages in the court clinic as an
apparatus for the gathering of psychiatric information to be used
45 Russell, supra note 43, at 3.4 6 D. Russell, The Role of the Court Clinic, 1 COURT CLINIC BuLLrIN (1956).
47 Interview with Dr. Eugene Balcanoff, M.D., Director of the Court Clinic
for the Superior Court of Suffolk County, Massachusetts, December 22, 1970.4 8 Russell, supra note 43, at 8; Interview with Judge Reuben L. Lurie, Crimi-
nial Division of the Superior Court of Suffolk County, Massachusetts, February 25,
1971.49 Interview with Judge Lurie, supra note 48.50 Russell, On Writing Reports to the Court, 1970 INTjNAxoNAI. JOURNAL or
O rmEsa THmn"r 2 (from a reprint).
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in the disposition of a defendant.r' First, there is the ease of
access to psychiatric facilities, because they are located in the
courthouse. Initially the judge would seem to be more willing to
submit the defendant to an examination under such conditions.
But just as important, if any questions arose as to the results or
the procedures of the examination, the ready accessibility of the
doctor would simplify the clarification of any points. Second, the
general educating influence on judges and other clinic personnel
of the exposure to the psychiatric discipline is also advantageous.
"Both Court and clinic personnel affirm the usefulness in the
remaining 95 per cent of cases [which are not referred to the
clinic], of the concepts learned by the court from clinic cases."
52
Finally, the close relationship between the clinic and the court
helps the psychiatrist develop his forensic ability. The develop-
ment of the forensic ability can only come by exposure of the
psychiatrist to legal proceedings.5 The Massachusetts judges are
of the opinion that the increased exposure has worked to the
advantage of the court: "All judges [who have had clinics in their
courts] agreed that having their own psychiatric services within
their courts was much more satisfactory to them, since communi-
cations, written reports and recommendations made by the court
clinics were better adopted to the legal framework."
54
IV. THE RIGHT TO A HEARING AT THE SENTENC]NG STAGE OF A TIAL
WHEN PsYcHrATIc INFORMATION Is UsED
An appropriate starting point for a discussion of the use of
51 This discussion assumes that there is available an alternative source of
psychiatric data which can be used in the dispositional phase of a trial. In fact.
however, psychiatric data is at a premium at all stages of sentencing and corrections.
See e.g., Note, supra note 27, at 485:
It is ap palling that there is no resident psychologist or psychiatrist at any
Kentucky correctional institution. As previously stated, the only data
available is obtained by independent contracts with psychologists. Psy-
chological data is available only when relating to those who are guilty of
crimes of violence. There is hardly any psychiatric data available for in-
mates in general, no matter what their needs or how heinous the crime
they have committed. [Based on an October, 1968 interview with the
Chairman of the Kentucky Parole Board.]
52 Russell, supra note 43, at 4.
53 See, Burger, supra note 1, at 6, where he states:
Psychiatric witnesses skilled in forensic arts ... are in short supply....
Skill as an expert witness can be acquired only after long years of experi-
ence in both the clinic and courtroom and a relatively few psychiatrists
have great forensic skill, no matter what their other professional attain-
ments may be.
54 Russell, supra note 43, at 3.
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psychiatric information at the dispositional stage is a consideration
of whether the use of that information requires that the defendant
be afforded a hearing.
In Specht v. Patterson5 5 Justice Douglas, speaking for the
majority, stated:
We held in Williams... that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment did not require a judge to hold hear-
ings and to give a convicted person an opportunity to partici-
pate in those hearings when he came to determine the sentence
to be imposed.5
It is submitted that this opinion is no longer in accordance with the
present state of the law of sentencing. Today, in order to comply
with constitutional mandates of due process, a sentencing hearing
must be afforded the defendant when psychiatric information is
used at sentencing.'T The right to a hearing is a necessary impli-
cation from the right to counsel at sentencing, as guaranteed by
Mempa v. Rhay58 where the judge imposed sentences at a hearing
at which the defendants were not represented by counsel. The
Supreme Court held that this denial of counsel at the sentencing
stage violated defendant's right to due process.5 9 The Court also
emphasized the critical nature of the sentencing process and the
role of the attorney.
It seems quite obvious that the Court does not conceive of the
lawyer's function at sentencing as that of a eunuch. ".... [T]he
necessity for the aid of counsel in marshaling the facts, introducing
evidence of mitigating circumstances and in general aiding and
assisting defendant to present his case as to a sentence is appar-
ent."' 0 The Court has subsequently affirmed that the attorney
5 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
56 Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. at 606.
571 do not mean to imply by this that only where psychiatric information is
used is the defendant entitled to a sentencing hearing. On the contrary, it would
seem that anytime the defendant is sentenced on the basis of information supplied
by anyone other than the defendant himself, a sentencing hearing would be
required.
68 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
59 Some lower courts had previously held that a lack of counsel at sentencing
may be prejudicial to the defendant. See, e.g., Martin v. United States, 182 F.2d
225 (5 Cir.), cert. denied 340 U.S. 892 (1950). States also usually reversed
sentences imposed without the presence of defendant's counsel. See, e.g., Remeriez
v. Maroney, 415 Pa. 534, 204 A.2d 450 (1964). See also, Note, supra note 18, at
834.6 0 Mempa v. Ehay, 389 U.S. at 135.
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has an important and multiple function at sentencing in McCon-
nell v. Rhay6l where the Court stated that "The right to counsel
at sentencing must.., be treated like the right to counsel at other
stages of adjudication."62
The necessary implication of the above is that counsel at the
sentencing stage of a trial must be afforded the opportunity to
properly function.63 To sterilize the function of counsel at the
sentencing stage would be in direct contradiction to the Court's
conception of an attorney's function-as expressed in Mempa-as
aiding in "marshalling the facts, introducing evidence of mit-
igating circumstances, and in general aiding and assisting de-
fendant to present his case. .. ."64
Further comments concerning the right to counsel have been
enunciated in Kent v. United States:65
[T]hese rights [to counsel] are meaningless-an illusion, a
mockery-unless counsel is given an opportunity to function.
The right to representation of counsel is not a formality. It
is not a grudging gesture to a ritualistic requirement. It is the
essence of justice. Appointment of counsel without affording
an opportunity for hearing on a "critically important" decision
is tantamount to denial of counsel.66 [Emphasis added]
The Court also took the opportunity to comment on its conception
of the importance of a hearing in this type of proceeding:
[T]here is no place in our system of law for reaching a result
of such tremendous consequences without ceremony-without
hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a
statement of reasons.... We do not mean by this to indicate
that the hearing to be held must conform with all the require-
ments of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative
hearing; but we do hold that the hearing must measure up to
the essentials of due process and fair treatment.
0 7
61393 U.S. 1 (1968).
62 McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. at 4.
63 For a good discussion of the proper role of counsel at the sentencing stage
of a trial, see Portman, The Defense Lawyer's New Role in the Sentencing Process,
34 Fed. Prob. 3 (1970); Steele, Counsel Can Count in Federal Sentencing, 56
A.B.A.J. 37 (1970).
64389 U.S. at 135.
65 383 U.S. 541 (1968).
66 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. at 561.
67 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. at 562.
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Conceding that Kent is dealing with a waiver of jurisdiction in a
juvenile proceeding, and realizing that the decision was based on
a statute, as opposed to the due process clause,68 it is nonetheless,
hard to escape the conclusion that, if the Court is expressing con-
cern for adequate procedural safeguards where there is a "crit-
ically important" decision made, the directives of Kent are ap-
plicable to a disposition proceeding. It is hard to imagine a
decision more "critically important" to a defendant than that
which determines whether he is to be executed 9 or whether he
is to be incarcerated one year or fifteen.70
If the right to counsel as guaranteed by Mempa and the re-
quirement from Kent that the counsel be given "an opportunity to
function" are to be observed, there must be afforded to the counsel
a forum in which he can perform his function. Professor Cohen
states with reference to the implication of that:
It is inconceivable, however, that the Court intended to create
so significant a right as representation by counsel and then to
allow the various jurisdictions either to nullify it by the adop-
tion or continuation of a "no right to a hearing" policy or to
dilute it by placing severe restraints on the nature of the
hearing and, therefore, on the role and function of counsel.71
The right to a hearing at the sentencing stage of a trial can be
supported on another ground other than the right to counsel.
Generally, wherever one has a sufficient interest in governmental
action, he has the right to participate in some hearing to determine
the course of action to be taken.72 In such cases the Court has
held that "a fundamental requisite of due process is the 'oppor-
681t is relevant to note that the next year after the Kent decision, the Court,
in the case of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), cleared up much confusion about
Kent by placing a juvenile's right to counsel on the same plane as the right to due
process of law. In that case a juvenile was committed to a State Industrial School
for a period of up to six years. This was accomplished at a hearing at which the
complainant was not afforded, inter alia, the right to counsel. The Court held that
this violated the juv'enile's right to due process of law.69 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
7 0 See note 24, supra.
71 Cohen, supra note 20, at 12.
7 2 See K. DAvis, AnasmcsTRrsvE LAW TivrxsE H 7.01-04 (1958) where
the author reviews the cases in Administrative Law in which the Court has held a
hearing was required. The author concludes:
The conclusion seems rather fully supported that a party who has a
sufficient interest or right at stake in determination of governmental
action should have an opportunity for a trial type hearing on issues of
adjudicative facts.
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tunity to be heard,"' 73 and that "it is an opportunity which must
be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."7 4
This was strongly pointed out in Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co.,
75
Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract
words of the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt
that at a minimum they require that a deprivation of life,
liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.76
If the criteria for the determination of the right to a hearing
is the possible deprivation of "life, liberty or property by adjudica-
tion," it seems clear that the sentencing hearing is within this
mandate.7 This is made even clearer in light of cases such as
Kent,78 In re Gault,79 and Specht v. Patterson,0 which show that
the Court is no longer willing to neglect the necessity for fair
procedures in hearings which were heretofore deemed as dis-
cretionary, non-retributive, or for the benefit of the defendant.81
V. TBE BiGHT TO CONTROVERT INFORMATION USED
BY A CoUiRT IN AssEssInG A SENTENCE
If the use of psychiatric data at disposition requires some type
of dispositional hearing, one must come to grips with the issue
of whether the defendant has the right to controvert such data,
and if he does, what procedure is required in order that his
73 Grannis v. Ordean, 284 U.S. 385, 394 (1914); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
at 267 (1970).
74 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970).
75 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
76 Id. at 313.
77 See Pugh & Carver, supra note 23, at 31 where the authors conclude that
the sentencing process would clearly fall within the above rule.
78 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
79 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
80386 U.S. 605, 608 (1967). In that case the defendant, who had been con-
victed for indecent liberties under a statute which carried a ten year sentence, was,
instead of being sentenced under that statute, sentenced without a hearing under a
sexual offender's act for an indeterminant period. Although the Court emphasized
that this situation was distinguishable from the normal post-conviction sentence
and that the full panoply of due process was necessary because the sentence was
based on a "new finding of fact ...that was not an ingredient of the offense
charged," I would agree with the commentators who are of the opinion that the
decision demonstrates that the court is "increasingly concerned about the rights of
defendants who ... [have] already been convicted of crime." Pugh & Carver,
supra note 23, at 29.81 See Pugh & Carver, supra note 23, at 31.
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objection may be effective. This issue has often been discussed
with respect to the use of presentence reports generally, but with
little specific consideration of the psychiatric data which may be
contained therein.82 Since the problems encountered in the use
of an ordinary presentence report are somewhat related to those
encountered in the use of psychiatric information, a discussion
of the current thoughts as to what procedures are necessitated by
the use of a ordinary presentence report will be useful at this
point.
A. The Right To Controvert The Presentence Report
The primary issue regarding the use of the presentence
report is the question of whether the report should be revealed to
the defendant and his counsel at the sentencing hearing as a
matter of right.83 The lines seem to be drawn not only along
philosophical lines, but also along occupational lines, with judges
84
and probation officers85 against a mandatory revelation of the
report, and defense attorneys8 and professional organizations"1
82 See, e.g.' Bach The Defendant's Right of Access to Presentence Reports, 4
Cams. L. BuLL. 160 (1968). But see Hg gins, Confidentiality of Presentence Re-
torts, 28 ALBANY L. Bxv. 12, 34 (1964) where he states that there may sometimes
be reasons not to reveal psychiatric data contained in the presentence report, as it
may tend to interfere with the treatment of the offender. But he is of the opinion
that the other parts of the report should be made available to the defendant.
For a list of the literature both in favor of and opposed to the disclosure of
the presentence report, see Wright, FEDEBaL PRACTiCE AND Pnocammua: Criminal
§ 524, at 396 n. 49 and n. 50 (1969).84 See ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards
Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures (Approved Draft 1967 at App.
A); Hoffman, What Next in Federal Rules, 21 WAsH. & Lax L. I~v. 1, 19 (1964),
himself a Federal District Court Judge, states that "[tirial judges are, almost
without exception, opposed to any requirement of disclosure." See also Wright,
supra note 83, § 524 at 898 wherein he reports the results of a survey revealing
that 290 federal judges opposed compulsory disclosure, 25 favored compulsory
disclosure, and 6 had no opinion.
85 See Higgins, supra note 82 at 29, wherein the author notes that "[]t has
been stated, perhaps with a bit of exaggeration, that the probation service, to a
man, is against providing the defendant with a copy or even allowing him to inspect
the report" citing Sharp, The Confidential Nature of Presentence Reports, 6 CATH.
U.L. B-v. 127 (1955).
86 The results of a survey taken in 1963 of defense attorneys practicing in the
District of Columbia showed that 94% (16 of 17) felt hampered by the non-dis-
closure of the presentence report. Junior Bar Section of the Bar Association of the
District of Columbia, Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 101, 124
(1963).
87 See, e.g., American Law Institute, Model Penal Code § 7.07(5) (Preliminary
Official Draft 1962) (requiring disclosure of the presentence report and a fair
opportunity to controvert, but the sources of confidential information need not be
disclosed); ABA Standards for Sentencing Alternatives, supra note 84 § 4.4, at
213-25 (recommends disclosure except where such action would disrupt rehabili-
tation or the information was obtained on a promise of confidentiality).
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generally favoring mandatory disclosure of the contents of the
report.
The arguments for and against the mandatory disclosure of the
presentence report have been stated and restated by many
commentators."" Those opposing compulsory disclosure of a pre-
sentence report usually start with the contention that after a
determination of guilt has been made at a trial, with all the
included protections, the trial judge is under no obligation to
reveal the contents of the report on which he bases his sentence. 9
This is essentially an argument that due process does not require
the judge to reveal the report. Although this argument is at best
questionable, 9 it seems quite clear that a majority of judges
agree91 that due process does not require the disclosure of the
contents of the presentence report.
92
After "getting by" the due process problem, those opponents
of disclosure assert that if the presentence reports are revealed to
the defendant, the sources of information available to the pro-
bation service will be destroyed.9 3 It has been emphasized that
the social agencies, wives, employers, physicians, etc. that provide
information would be extremely reluctant to do so 94 because of
possible harassment, physical threats, embarrassment, family
88 For a summary of the arguments both for and against the disclosure of the
contents of the presentence report, see Schaffer The Defendant's Right to Access to
Presentence Reports, 3 Cr m. L. BurL. 674 (1967); Lehrich, The Use and Dis-
closure of Presentence Reports in the United States, 47 F.R.D. 225, 238-46 (1969).
89 Schaffer, supra note 88, at 677.
90 See the discussion at p. 302 infra.
91 E.g., Judge Hoffman has stated: "The Supreme Court has affirmatively held
that it is not a denial of due process of law for a court imposing sentence, to rely
on a report of a presentence investigation without disclosing such report to the
defendant or giving him an opportunity to rebut it." Hoff-man, supra note 84, at
19. See also the cases cited in Lehrich, supra note 88, at 228, n. 19, for a list of
federal cases holding the trial judge was not required to reveal the contents of the
presentence report. A survey of the judges in Missouri showed that 97% of the
responding judges felt that disclosure of the presentence report was not required
by due process. Note, The Use of Pre-Investigations in Missouri, 1964 WA.sm
U.L.Q. 396, 405.9 2 Judge Hincks states: "In my view after conviction a case ceases to be an
action at law and becomes a social problem." Hincks, In Opposition of Rule 84
(c) (2), Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 8 Fed. Prob. 3, 7 (Oct.-
Dec. 1944).
93 See, e.g., Id. judge Hoffman has perhaps been a bit too pessimistic in his
appraisal of the effect of mandatory disclosure when he opined that "any mandatory
disclosure may tend to destroy the probation system." Hoffman, supra note 84, at
19. 94 See generally Parsons, The Presentence Investigation Report Must be Pre-
served as a Confidential Document, 28 Fed. Prob. 3 (Mar. 1964).
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breakups, hard feelings, etc.95 The fear of the probation officers
is that if these parties decide not to give the information about
the defendant the presentence report will become practically
worthless. As one writer has said, the result of disclosure would
be "a weak, ineffective report, with little or none of the more
meaningful data, on attitudes, feelings and personal standards and
relationships so essential to adequate presentence investigation
reports and probation supervision." 6
Another attack on the disclosure school of thought is the belief
that the disclosure will result in a delay of the proceedings. As
one writer put it, to allow the disclosure ".... will conjure up an
entire new set of procedures which may precipitate sentencing
delay."17 It is obvious that this contention has had its effect on
the Supreme Court, as the Court in Williams v. New York pointed
out that the type and extent of sentencing information "make
totally impractical if not impossible open court testimony with
cross-examination. Such a procedure could endlessly delay crim-
inal administration in a retrial of collateral issues." 8
Another of the arguments against disclosure is that it will be
harmful to the defendant. This view proceeds on the assumption
that if the information reveals a picture of the defendant that he
had heretofore not accepted, the result can be disastrous on any
attempt to rehabilitate the defendant.9 9 Keve, himself a probation
officer, states:
Every person makes use of certain defense devices that
help him to rationalize and live more comfortably with his
shortcomings....
if he reads a report that suddenly strips his personality naked,
he will deny the picture he is shown and reject the help that is
accordingly offered.100
95 Roche, The Position for Confidentiality of the Presentence Investigation Re-
port, 29 ALBANY L. REv. 206, 217-24 (1965); Barnett & Gronewold, Confidentiality
of the Presentence Report, 26 Fed. Prob. 28 (Mar. 1962).
96 Sharp, The Confidential Nature of Presentence Reports, 5 CAT.E. U.L. REV.
127, 188 (1965).97 Parsons, supra note 94, at 7.
9 8 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. at 250.
99 Roche, supra note 95, at 219, explains his thoughts on the danger of this
"disclosure overdose."
100 Y- -v, TE PROBATION OFFicER INVESTIGATES 10 (1960). He goes on to
emphasize that the damage may be particularly probable when the defendant has
"some paranoid characteristics."
Both Hincks, supra note 92 and Parsons, supra note 94 agree with this position.
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Although there are other arguments against disclosure'0 1 the
foregoing are the most persuasive.
The advocates of disclosure believe that the presentence re-
port, or at least a summary of it, should be disclosed to the de-
fendant and his counsel."0 2 It seems at present that there may be
some trend toward this position. 10 3 In favor of disclosure, it is
asserted that due process and fairness require that the defendant
be advised of information which is used in determining his dis-
position. The crux of this argument is that sentencing is a vital
part of the criminal proceedings, and that to sentence the de-
fendant on information which he has not been allowed to see is
so unfair as to deprive the defendant of his right to due process.104
These advocates reject the notion that: anything less than a
maximum sentence is a privilege, and that, since due process
protects the rights of a defendant and not privileges granted to
him, the judge, in determining whether to grant this privilege,
can rely on any material he wishes. One author points out that
most persons convicted of felonies do not receive the maximum
sentence. Thus, "[wihen a judge metes out a maximum sentence,
he treats a defendant more harshly than most persons convicted
of the crime are treated. To call a defendant's interest in receiving
a lesser sentence a privilege seems, therefore, misleading."' 5 The
proponents of disclosure contend that the defendant is left vir-
tually at the mercy of any bias or mistake included in the pre-
sentence report, and that this is so grossly unfair as to deny the
defendant due process of law. But the opposition argues that
protection for the defendant can be achieved in other ways. One
probation official stated that the necessary protection is afforded
by the probation officer's constantly reviewing and checking
101 Other arguments advanced by writers opposed to the disclosure of the
presentence report are that "[a]n already over worked probation department, if
they are to maintain any degree of integrity, will be forced to prepare a separate
report for the defendant." Parsons, supra note 94 at 7. That the lack of a
presentence report caused by the drying up of information sources would cause
the judge to deny probation more often thanhe does when he has such presentence
information. Id. at 5-6.
102 E.g., Pugh & Carver, supra note 23, at 37.
103 E.g., Bach, supra note 82. The trend is especially noticeable among the
legal professional organizations. See generally, Wright, supra note 83, § 524 at 396
for a listing of these professional groups. See also note 87, supra.
104 Higgins, supra note 82, at 27 where the author states that the secret report
is "self-insulative" and "the extent of error that creeps into the reports is virtually
incapable of ascertainment."
105 Pugh & Carver, supra note 23, at 32.
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information from the various informants, thereby discovering
discrepancies. Also, that writer finds much protection in the
possibility that the judge may ask the defendant questions about
the contents of the report.108 Another author finds the necessary
protection should be achieved by a "uniformly high quality of
federal probation officers.", 7
A somewhat related view (that fairness demands the de-
fendant be advised of the contents of the report) is that to allow
the defendant access will enable him to clarify and refute the data
contained within the report.'08 Disclosure permits "the discussion
to be directed to pertinent considerations" 10 9 and it will aid the
judge in his consideration of the proper weight to be given each
factor. In relation to this view Higgins polled judges across the
country as to their experiences with disclosure to the defendant
and concluded that: "The observation was often made that one
of the most salutary experiences of the practice of disclosure is
that it provokes responses, attitudes, opinions, and suggestions
which are valuable to the court in arriving at more sensitive
determinations."110
In opposition to the argument above that a disclosure could
militate against rehabilitation of the defendant is the view that
disclosure of the basis of a sentence will help the defendant to
better understand and accept the sentence as just; thus the de-
fendant will not feel that he is being punished unjustly or too
severely. Judge Thomsen has explained it as follows: "If he [the
defendant] knows that nothing is being withheld from his
attorney, he cannot justly feel that he is being left out of the
decision, that his fate was sealed in advance, that the courtroom
procedure was only window-dressing, or that he is a pawn of the
whims of the judge or the probation officer or both."-"'
'90 Roche, supra note 95.
307 Parsons supra note 94, at 7. Although I do not express an opinion as to
the quality of the Federal Probation Officers, it is this author's opinion that there
are severe limitations on the time which such Probation Officers can spend on each
case. See, Note supra note 18, at 837, n. 82, where that author cites the 1966
figures for the average case load of the Federal Probation Officers, and compares
them to the recommended loads. It appears that such officers have about twice
the number of the recommended maximums. Also, the footnote indicates that the
overload is aggravated by the high turnover in probation officers.
'0 8 Schaffer, supra note 88, at 677.
IoD Higgins, supra note 82, at 32.
11o Id.
11" Id., (quoting judge Roszel C. Thomsen, United States District Court for
the District of Maryland).
19721
KENmTcIC LAw JouRNAL
Most of the other arguments advanced by the "disclosure
school" are primarily aimed at refuting the arguments of the
"non-disclosure school." The disclosure school also points out that
empirical data indicates that "the reasons of most concern to those
who oppose disclosure are 'paper dragons' for the reason that they
have either not troubled the jurisdictions which disclose, or any
trouble experienced has been far short of predicted magnitude."" 2
With regard to the belief that a disclosure will delay the pro-
ceedings, Higgins, based on a poll of Federal and State judges,1 3
found that, of all the judges who practiced disclosure, none com-
plained "that the sentencing process had become unduly pro-
tracted by defendant's opportunity to take exception to and
controvert data contained in the reports." In fact, Higgins reported
that several judges stated "that disclosure permits the scope of
argument regarding sentencing to be limited and permits the
discussion to be directed to pertinent considerations." 14 Other
commentators contend that even if disclosure will delay the pro-
ceedings, when this is weighed against the requirement of fairness
to the defendant, the former must be compromised to the degree
of allowing the defendant access to the report." 5 Still others have
defended the possibility of a delay as a positive benefit, in that it
allows more time for the attorney to gather information to aid his
client at the sentencing process."16
Those commentators in favor of disclosure also assert that
there is little, if any, evidence of a drying up of information in
jurisdictions in which disclosure is regularly practiced. Again,
the empirical evidence of Higgins indicates that judges do not
feel that disclosure results in a decrease in the supply of informa-
tion concerning the defendant."7 Another commentator notes
that at the guilt determination stage of the trial "[tlhere is no
guarantee of confidentiality for testimony, but the system
112 Higgins, supra note 82, at 30. Higgins himself took a poll by sendin 345
questionnaires to district judges throughout the United States. He received 197
replies, 167 of which he considered responsive. He also sent 164 questionnaires to
New York judges, receiving 57 replies, 48 of which he considered responsive.
113 See note 112 supra, for details of the poll.
"14 Higgins, supra note 82, at 32. The work by Higgins has often been cited
by other commentators in support of their positions. See, e.g., Parsons, supra note
101.
115 See, e.g., Lehrich, supra note 88, at 240.
116 ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, supra note 84,
commentary § 4.4 at 222-24.
"17 Higgins, supra note 82, at 22.
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works."1 8 Others have joined in the conclusion of Higgins and
concluded that "experience... belies the fear that, as... sources
of confidential information dry up, probation officers are deprived
of trustworthy and logical informants and the object of the report
is defeated, if the contents of reports are disclosed."" 9 Still
another commentator reports that in California, where disclosure
is required 20 there have been no signs of a loss of information.' 21
With regard to the presentence report (assuming the report
contains no psychiatric information), it appears that the latter
arguments are more persuasive-that the information contained
in the presentence report must be made available to the de-
fendant.
It would seem that non-disclosure of a presentence report
violates the defendant's right to due process. In Townsend v.
Burke,1 22 the Supreme Court overturned a sentence which was
based on false information about the defendant's background. In
holding that this violated the defendant's right to due process the
Court stated:
Consequently, on this record, we conclude that, while dis-
advantaged by lack of counsel, this prisoner was sentenced on
the basis of assumptions concerning his criminal record which
were materially untrue. Such a result, whether caused by
carelessness or design, is inconsistent with due process of law,
and such a conviction cannot stand.123
From the above language it is obvious that there were two
elements of impropriety mentioned by the Court: (1) lack of
counsel; (2) a sentence based on untrue assumptions. So far
as the first condition is concerned, the lack of counsel at the
dispositional stage, it is hard to base the decision on this, because
at the time there was no right to counsel at the dispositional stage
118 Parsons, supra note 101, at 30.
119 Baker v. United States, 888 F.2d 931, 935 (4th Cir. 1968) (Winter, con-
curring). See also I-iggins, supra note 82, at 31-32, quoting an address by Chief
Judge Roszel C. Thomsen, United States District Court for the District of Maryland,
at the Federal Probation System Inservice Training Institute, Annapolis, Md.,
October 10, 1962 (p. 10 of unpublished copy), in which Judge Thomsen arrives
at the same conclusion.
120 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203 (West 1966 Supp.).
121 Bach, supra note 82, at 160-61.
122 34 U.S. 736 (1948).
128 Id. at 740-41. See also Keenan v. Burke, 342 U.S. 881 (1951) (per
curiam, citing Townsend).
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of a trial.2 The heart of the matter seems to be contained in the
second part of the quotation-that the sentence was based on
untrue information. 2 5 Thus the proposition emerging from Town-
send appears to be that one has the right to a sentence based on
accurate information. Still the question remains as to what pro-
cedural safeguards, if any, is the defendant entitled in order to
insure that he is not sentenced on the basis of false information?
Several commentators'26 believe, correctly, that the spirit of
Townsend, as well as the necessary implication of the holding,
leads to the conclusion that the defendant must be afforded the
necessary machinery to insure the accuracy of the information
used in determining sentence.2 7 Otherwise the Townsend de-
cision would stand for the proposition that one has the right to
be sentenced on accurate information, but no right to find out if
the information is accurate.
To sentence a defendant on the basis of information which is
not disclosed to him would seem to violate the above principle of
due process. It would leave him virtually unprotected against any
mistake and/or bias which may slip in to the report. Mistakes are
bound to occur and, in fact, do occur.2 s In this respect Roche's
position that protection is afforded by the constant checking and
comparing by the probation service of the information received
from other informants is totally unacceptable.' 29 Likewise the
proposition that adequate protection of the defendant can be left
to depend on a highly skilled, professional staff of probation
officers is not very convincing. 3 0 In the first place, it appears
' 24 Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
"Mere lack of counsel in this non-capital case at the time that it came down
would not have produced this result." Higgins, supra note 82, at 20. But see W.
BENEY, THE RIGrr To COUNSEL rN AmEcAN COURTS 184-85 (1965) where he
concludes that the case was based on the lack of counsel.
' 2 5 This seems to be the view taken by the majority of commentators. See, e.g.,
Note, Right of Criminal Offenders to Challenge Reports Used in Determining
Sentence, 49 CoLum. L. R;v. 567, 570 (1949).
126 I-Iiggins, supra note 82, at 20; Bach, supra note 82 at 168.
127 For a discussion of cases involving inaccurate and inadequate presentence
reports, see New Jersey v. Kunz, 259 A.2d 895 (N.J. 1962); New Jersey v. Pohlabel,
160 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1960); United States ex rel Jackson v. Myers, 374 F.2d 707
(3d Cir. 1967).
128 There have been a number of cases come to light in which the presentence
report contained mistakes. See e.g., United States ex rel. Jackson v. Myers, 374
F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1967); New Jersey v. Pohlabel, 160 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1960). See
New Jersey v. Kunz, 359 A.2d 895 (N.J. 1969) for a discussion of cases involving
inaccurate and inadequate presentence reports.
' 2 9 See Roche, supra note 95.
13 0 See note 107, supra.
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that most probation officers are handling more cases than they
have time to properly handle.I'' But even if all probation officers
were absolutely competent and had time to properly administer
each case, proper safeguards for the defendant must depend on
the advocacy of his rights by someone whose interests are the
same as his. The probation officer, who owes primary duties to
others than the defendant, cannot provide this protection of the
rights of the convicted. This must be accomplished by an at-
torney. Thus it would appear that to deny the defendant the right
to examine the presentence report would deny him the adequate
procedure to prevent a sentence based on false information.
Beyond the necessity for a procedure to insure that false
information does not go undetected, to allow the defendant to be
sentenced without disclosure of the contents of the presentence
report is to effectively deny him the right to counsel as prohibited
by Mempa and Kent. To say that Mempa insures that one has the
right to counsel, but that this counsel need not be advised of the
contents of the presentence report is to make the right to counsel
what was referred to in Kent as "meaningless-an illusion, a
mockery.... ,132 The Court in Kent said that "[t]hese rights [to
counsel] are meaningless... unless counsel is given an opportunity
to function. The right to representation of counsel is not a
formality. It is not a grudging gesture to a ritualistic requirement.
It is the essence of justice." 33 To do otherwise would constitute
a denial of the requirement that counsel be given "an opportunity
to function."'" 4
Even if due process considerations did not require the dis-
closure of the presentence report the defendant should be shown
the contents of the report. The contention that sources of infor-
mation may dry up and that the disclosure of the report may be
harmful to the defendant are at best questionable, and possibly
"paper dragons." As shown earlier, opinions of judges and em-
pirical data tend to dispel this loss of information argument. 135
In regard to the possible harm to the defendant, it is con-
ceivable that derogatory opinions of friends, family, or employer
is' Id.
132 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561.
138 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561.
134 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561.
13 5 See text at p. 47, supra.
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of the defendant could endanger a relationship which is important
to the defendant's mental well-being. But, because of the number
of variables involved in the underlying assumptions of the propo-
sition, it is far from clear how often such circumstances exist.
For example, if the information is an opinion about the defendant,
the defendant would have to be benefiting from a relationship
with the individual who had a derogatory opinion about him.
Further, this hostile opinion would have to be unknown to the
defendant or at least denied by him. If the information were
factual, the defendant may feel betrayed; however, the occurrence
and extent of this harm remain speculative.
As to the belief that the disclosure of the report will endlessly
delay the proceedings, available data suggests that this is not
true in courts which practice disclosure. 36
The above views cannot be dismissed without recognition of
the fact that, in some cases, there may be a direct possibility that
disclosure of the report will cause delay, loss of sources of infor-
mation and harm to the defendant. In such a case, fairness to the
defendant would still seem to require disclosure of the report.
The defendant's interest in being sentenced only on accurate
information must be recognized.
Although the above analysis suggests that due process and
fairness require that the defendant be provided the information
contained in the presentence report, neither consideration re-
quires that the defendant be afforded the right to confront and
cross-examine every informant who provides information used
in the presentence report. 3 7 The elaborateness of the procedure
necessary to insure the defendant's right to due process is a
functional decision. It is determined by weighing the defendant's
interest in the threatened loss against the "government's interest
in summary adjudication."8 8 The minimum procedural apparatus
entails a consideration of "the precise nature of the government
function involved as well as of the private interest that has been
affected by governmental action."'3 9 The interest of the defendant
186 See text at p. 46, supra.
187 This appears to be the holding of Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241
4198" Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970).
189 Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961).
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is obvious: since most defendants plead guilty1 40 the decision as
to the penalty is the only decision which will affect his future. He
is vitally interested in whether he will get a life sentence or
whether he will be sentenced to death.141 It is also quite obvious
that the government has an interest in an abbreviated proceeding
at the sentencing stage of the trial. In light of the present burden
of the court system and the long delay before cases are brought
to trial, the interest of the government in preventing endless
"delay" in "criminal administration ... [by having] a retrial of
collateral issues"14 must also be recognized. Unlike the alleged
delay resulting from mere disclosure of the report, the delay
resulting from each informant testifying at a disposition hearing
is virtually certain. It is also important to remember that the
number of facts relevant to sentencing would be infinite, thereby
contributing to the delay.
A proper balance of the above considerations could be
achieved by supplying the defendant with the presentence report,
and allowing him to refute any of the information which he
thinks is untrue or biased.143 It should be remembered that the
type of information which we are concerned with is the factual-
type and opinions of non-experts, such as the defendant's em-
ployer, wife, etc. Generally, such information as the number of
his convictions, his reputation in the community, etc., could be
controverted by facts and opinions which the defendant could
obtain without cross-examining the informants. This could be
presented by the defendant to the judge in the form of affidavits,
statements, etc., without the need of an undue consumption of
the court's time.
B. Right to Controvert The Psychiatric Report
As previously suggested, allowing the defendant access to the
presentence report would satisfy the demands of due process
140 See note 35, supra.
141 E.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
142 Id. at 250.
143 Here I have made explicit a previously implicit assumption. That is, the
right to controvert this report must include the right to introduce evidence which
tends to disprove the presentence report. This is a necessary corollary to the right
of disclosure. Otherwise the defendant would be in the curious situation of having
a right to disclosure but no right to disprove inaccuracies found in the report. For
a discussion of the right to present mitigating evidence at a sentencing hearing,
see Note, supra note 18, at 841-43.
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because with regard to the non-psychiatric information, it is
possible to insure the accuracy of such information and allow the
defendant's counsel sufficient latitude to perform his duty merely
by disclosing the report. The use of psychiatric information in
sentencing, however, raises problems of a somewhat distinct
nature. Because of these problems, it is wrong to blithely include
psychiatric information in the general discussion of a presentence
report and thereby assume that the same procedure would like-
wise protect the interests of defendant and society. To determine
the proper safeguards when using psychiatric information, it is
necessary to analyze the unique characteristics of the information
and the method by which it is obtained and presented to the
court.
One must begin by recognizing that there has been a legisla-
tive investment to determine disposition in one other than the
psychiatric profession. Usually the judge has the duty to de-
termine sentence144 and the psychiatrist should not be allowed
to determine the length of an offender's incarceration. "If it is
claimed that he [the psychiatrist] can do this better than either
jury or judge, then this position must lead to the revision of our
basic legal structure." 4 - Until such a revision, the power to
determine disposition is a power of the court.146 The court also
has the duty to use all appropriate scientific data in order to
bring the disposition into line with current philosophy of sen-
tencing.147 As Professor Kaplan has stated, "the judge ... [has]
the responsibility of assimilation and wisely using the total
knowledge of man so as to reduce any cultural lag between the
law and existing knowledge."
48
Concerning the psychiatrist's role at the sentencing stage, one
must remember that he occupies a position distinct from other
"informants" who supply information about the convicted de-
fendant. This is because the information given by the psy-
chiatrist is of a type that cannot be effectively controverted by
anyone but another psychiatrist. A brief example should demon-
strate this principle. If the defendant's boss says that the de-
144 E.g., FED. R. CmM. PRo. 32.
145 Suarez, note 7 supra, at 177.
146 Schmideberg, note 7 supra, at 27.
147 See text at p. 8, supra.
148 Kaplan, An Academic Lawyer Plays Armchair Analyst. Some Speculations
of the Relevance of Psycho-Analysis to the Law, 46 NEB. L. REv. 759, 766 (1967).
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fendant is always drunk on the job, or if the defendant's wife
says he beats her, it would seem probable that the mere dis-
closure of these statements in the presentence report would
allow the defendant to refute the allegation by introducing state-
ments of other persons who deny the truth of the former
allegations. 4 " However, it would be much more difficult for the
defendant to convince the judge by lay testimony that, contrary
to the psychiatrist's testimony, he (the defendant) is not a
sociopath and a danger to society. To be sure, it is possible that
some judges would give more weight to lay testimony tending to
show that the psychiatrist was wrong in his analysis. But it
appears that judges do give strong consideration to the findings of
psychiatrists,' 50 and it would seem that as a general proposition,
a judge would be reluctant to disregard an unfavorable psychi-
atrist's report and grant probation or a light sentence on the basis
of a layman's opinion which is contrary to that of a psychiatrist.
Further, any such lay testimony cannot go directly to the
issue of whether defendant is a sociopath. Rather, the lay testi-
mony could only go to the manifestations of this disorder.
All the witness could say is that the defendant has not com-
mitted any anti-social acts so long as he has known him. But
this does not successfully refute the psychiatric testimony. It
only shows that the manifestations of the disorder are unknown
to the witness. The doctor could have based his medical con-
clusion on the interview and tests he performed, as well as infor-
mation unknown to the witness. Thus, even assuming that the
witness is believed, that testimony is less effective against a
psychiatrist's opinion than the testimony of one layman disagree-
ing with another.
1491 recognize that there may be some allegations about the defendant con-
tained in the presentence report which, because the alleged fact is known only to
the informant, could not be refuted by the statement of a third party. But even in
that case, the defendant himself could deny the allegation.
150 Professor Vamm has reported that, with regard to determination of
competency to stand trial, "judges have followed the major findings of the psy-
chiatrist in all but one of the cases [he] studied." Vamm, Pretrial Determination
and Judicial Decision Making: An Analysis of the Use of Psychiatric Information in
the Administration of Criminal Justice, 43 DET. L.J. 13, 24 (1965).
Dr. Szasz believes that psychiatric data is important in a judge's determination
of the severity of sentence. It is his opinion that because of the judge's strong
feelings of guilt, he needs the authority to over-come these feelings and mete out
a severe sentence. Szasz, Some Observations on the Relationship Between Psy-
chiatry and the Law, 75 AMA ARcmvs oF N -EROLOGY AND PSYCmATY 297
(1956).
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The uniqueness of the psychiatrist's position is also due to the
fact that normally there will be only one psychiatrist (if indeed
there are any) involved at the determination of sentence. It is
obvious that with regard to the 80% to 60% of felons who are
indigents, it would be impossible for them to afford the services
of a competent psychiatrist. 151 Even with regard to persons above
the indigent level, the availability of a second psychiatrist may
be practically foreclosed. It must be remembered that the scarcity
of psychiatric resources in some areas of the nation may neces-
sitate substantial travel expenses in order to obtain the necessary
psychiatric examination. Also, when a psychiatrist is asked to
give an opinion after an unfavorable opinion by another psychi-
atrist, he would normally be reluctant to give a favorable opinion
without an extensive examination 15 2 which would obviously in-
crease the costs of his service.53 Thus, as a practical matter, a
substantial percentage of dispositional determinations are made
in circumstances in which it would be impossible for the defendant
to controvert the court appointed psychiatrist by introducing his
own psychiatric data.
The above should demonstrate that, in a substantial per-
centage of the dispositional determinations, any controversion
of the report of the psychiatrist must come from an attack on the
report itself. This is because of the inability of a layman to
controvert the psychiatrist's report and the unavailability of
other psychiatric data.
In light of these considerations and in light of the defendant's
right to procedure which will prevent his being sentenced on
inaccurate information, it would seem that If psychiatric informa-
tion is to be used at sentencing, the report must be in such a
form so that the report itself is attackable. That is, the report
151 It is generally estimated that 30% to 60% of all persons charged with
felonies cannot even afford the cost of counsel. Hall, Kamisar, La Fave & Israel,
MODERN CMMItAL PROCEDURE 80 (3rd ed. 1969).
The authors go on to cite the figures compiled by the Junior Bar Section of
the Bar Association of the District of Columbia, Report of the Committee on
Standards of Indigency 31 (1963) which suggests that the percentage of accused
felons unable to afford psychiatric help would be substantially above the afore-
mentioned figure. The Association found that 40% were unemployed when
arrested; another 28% lost their jobs before arraignment; and a majority of the
remaining defendants earned less than $40 per week.
152 Interview with Dr. Alan A. Stone, Lecturer on Law and Assistant Professor
of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, April 1, 1971.
158 Dr. Stone roughly estimated the cost of such examination at $800. Id.
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must be in such detail, or the psychiatrist must be available to
add such detail, that an attorney'54 can point to inadequacies
in the procedure or the report of the psychiatrist. Unless the
report is in such a form the defendant's counsel is unable to
protect the defendant from being sentenced on inadequate
information, and the defendant's counsel is not afforded adequate
procedure to perform his assigned function.
The problem of the impregnable psychiatric report is com-
pounded by the fact that it is at least possible for two honest
and competent psychiatrists examining the same clinical data to
reach different conclusions. 55 This is a result of many factors, not
the least of which is the nature of the science itself: "[tlhe science
of psychiatry cannot provide absolutely certain answers to many
questions."15 The varying schools of thought,'157 the type of
methodology used by the psychiatrist, 5 and the "biases that the
psychiatrist... has as a member of his profession, as a whole, and
as a citizen in society..."'59 are all factors which could contribute
to a professional disagreement among the psychiatrists examining
the same patient. Dr. Roberts, an Associate Professor of Psychi-
atry at the University of Wisconsin, summed up the problem as
follows:
[A] number of schools of thought have developed in the field
of psychiatry. Each school has its own theoretical under-
pinning for evaluating the mental status of a given person, as
well as its own treatment approaches. Psychiatrists from dif-
ferent schools of thought may view a clinical problem in a
different manner even though they base their conclusions on
154 1 do not indulge the fiction that all attorneys are of suffcient competence
and energy to analyze the report of psychiatrists. But the fact that some attorneys
lack these attributes does not mean that one's right to be sentenced on accurate
information is nullified. Instead, it is necessary to arrive at a procedure by which
an energetic attorney can protect the rights of his client at sentencing.
( 5 Meyers, The Psychiatric Examination, 54 J. Cnm. L.C. & P.S. 481, 433(1963).
'56 Roberts, Some Observations on the Problems of the Forensic Psychiatrist,
1965 Wis. L. Ptv. 240, 244. See also Comment, supra note 2, at 385 wherein the
author states:
He [i.e., the psychiatrist] places the system before us, not in the hope that
it is exact or that it will ever quantify, but rather that it offers more
information and better comprehension of the human behavior than any
other system presently can. Psychiatry does not claim to be mathematical.
'57 Roberts, supra note 156, at 244.
158 Kaplan, supra note 148, at 781.
159 Id.
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the same information. Thus it is clear that the manner in
which a psychiatrist examines a patient or responds to ques-
tions may be dependent, to a large extent upon the school of
thought to which he adheres. . .. [PIsychiatrists disagree
among themselves because of adherence to one or another
school of thought.160
Any effective controverting of the psychiatrist's report must
include procedure by which the attorney could discover the
acceptability of the school of thought of the psychiatrist, his
methodology, and whether it is possible that other psychiatrists
may disagree with his conclusions. It would seem that the only
source of such information is the psychiatrist who performed the
examination. Further, it would seem that the written report may
not be able to convey sufficient information without being
unusually long, detailed, and confusing. Therefore it may be
that in this instance the mere disclosure of the psychiatric report
would not be sufficient to meet the requirements of due process.
Another set of problems with regard to a psychiatric examina-
tion could occur if the conclusions are based on an inadequate
examination or inadequate techniques. For example, some doctors
have warned of "minimal psychiatric evaluation . . . presented
as a full examination.... ."' A psychiatrist may not have devoted
adequate time to the interviewing of the defendant, and there is
always the possibility that the cause of deviant behavior is
organic. Thus it may be that a physical examination is required.162
Or it may be that the actual interview techniques of the psychi-
atrist are subject to doubt as to their efficacy. 63 There is the
160 Roberts, supra note 156. See also Diamond & Louisell, The Psychiatrist as
an Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and Speculations, 63 MicH. L. REv. 1335,
1341 (1965) wherein the authors state:
Further, his [i.e., the psychiatrist's] inferences as well as his observations,
are strongly colored by the qualities of his instrument: that is, his own
personality, experience, and theoretical training.
161 Roberts, supra note 156, at 243. See also Meyers, supra note 155, at 431
where he states: 'Too often conclusions given are the result of impressions,
intuitions, and even hunches."
162 Id. at 435 where the author states that although a physical examination
frequently does not contribute notable information, "very often the physical may
confirm suspicions entertained by the examiner about his case. . . . Then, of
course, at times a central nervous system, or systemic, disease process may be
uncovered to explain aberrant action."
163 Yd. at 435 where the author comments on the techniques of indirect
questioning as the most acceptable form of interview. But see Freedman & Cutler,
Structured Interview Method for Psychiatric Research, 135 J. NEa. MENTAL Dis.
346 (1962) for an opposing view.
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further problem often faced by the psychiatrist of incomplete
medical and psychiatric history available to the doctor when he
examines the defendant. One psychiatrist has stated that "it is
at times next to impossible, and always extremely difficult, to
obtain a proper psychiatric history."6 4 This void of information
makes an adequate examination more difficult for the psychiatrist:
"With a poor medical history, such as one which may be distorted,
confused, or... replete with misrepresentations, it is often taxing
for the psychiatrist to present a valid conclusion or opinion." 65
It is possible that all or any of one of the above inadequacies
could be presented at a psychiatric examination. It is also possible
that a vaguely written psychiatric report could hide these inade-
quacies of technique or information. In such a case the mere
disclosure of the psychiatric 'report would not permit the de-
fendant to determine if the information in the report was based
on acceptable techniques.
Another reason that the defendant needs procedural safeguards
when psychiatric information is used is that the psychiatrists'
record of predicting the dangerousness of defendant is somewhat
questionable. The studies which are available tend to show that
the psychiatrist is a poor predictor of dangerousness. The errors
in prediction seem to be biased in the direction of over-prediction:
"They tend to predict anti-social conduct in many instances where
it would not, in fact, occur."'66 It is obvious that such an over-
prediction could be to the disadvantage of a defendant at sen-
tencing.
The foregoing discussion indicates that the psychiatric report
can be the source of problems with regard to the defendant's right
to test the accuracy of the report. The discussion further suggests
that, unlike the situation in which the ordinary presentence report
not containing psychiatric data is used, the mere disclosure of the
report may not protect the rights of the defendant. But there are
arguments on the other hand, that the report of the psychiatrist
should remain secretive from the convicted defendant.
The most cogent of the views against disclosure of the psychi-
' 64 De La Vega, A View of the Psychiatrist and His Opinion in the Law, 13
N.Y.L. F. 659, 666-67 (1967).
165 Id. at 667.
166 Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal Process: A Knife That Cuts Both Ways,
4 TRImL 29, 32 (Feb.-Mar. 1968).
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atric data is that to reveal the report to the defendant may be
harmful to him in that the shock of an evaluation of his psycho-
logical make-up may constrain attempts to rehabilitate the de-
fendant (patient) .162' Thus, it is argued, in the interests of pro-
tecting the defendant from a "disclosure overdose" which may
decimate an already weak ego, and in the interests of rehabilitating
a defendant, the results of the psychiatric examination should not
be disclosed to the defendant. This view, however, is based on
some dubious assumptions. First, this belief is based on the
assumption that a psychiatrist could not write a report of a
psychiatric examination in such a way as to be harmless to the
defendant and yet be as potent for dispositional purposes as is
the normal type of report which is prepared for the judge. This,
at best, is a tenuous assumption. One psychiatrist was of the
opinion that such a report was entirely possible. He stated that,
although such a report would not be the same as a report which
a patient would not be allowed to see, it could contain information
qualitatively as good for dispositional purposes as any other
report.16
8
The possibility of harm to the defendant would seem to be
greater, however, if the psychiatrist were required to be subjected
to cross-examination in open court. In such a situation it may be
impossible for him to avoid the answers which may in fact harm
the defendant. It would require a doctor versed in the forensic
art to assure that the ineptness of an over-zealous attorney did
not result in harm to the defendant.6 9
Another contention, that the defendant should not be allowed
to examine the psychiatric report or cross-examine the psychi-
atrist is that, as with the presentence report, such a procedure
,67,Keve, supra note 100, at 10, where he states that if defendant reads a
report "that suddenly strips his personality naked, he will deny the picture he is
shown and reject the help that is accordingly offered. See also Roche, supra note
95, at 219; Hincks, supra note 92, at 5.
168 Interview with Dr. Alan A. Stone, supra note 152 on March 19, 1971.
169 Chief Justice Burger has stated:
[P]sychiatric witnesses skilled in forensic arts . . . are in short supply.
Skill as an expert witness can be acquired only after long years of experi-
ence in both clinic and courtroom and relatively few psychiatristshave
great forensic skill no matter what their other professional attainments
may be.
Burger, supra note 1, at 6.
It may be noted that a benefit of the court clinic system is relevant to this
consideration. The constant forensic exposure of the court clinic psychiatrist would
be helpful in developing those skills necessary to deal with this problemA.
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would appreciably delay the proceedings. But this argument is
subject to the same counter-arguments as explicated in the section
of this paper on the presentence report. First, at least the ABA
Advisory Committee on Sentencing is of the opinion that a some-
what protracted proceeding is necessary in order for the attorney
to discover information helpful to his client.170 Also, judges who
practice disclosure have not complained of protracted proceed-
ings. 17' But the assertion of delay is even less persuasive when
one is considering psychiatric data. This is because the informa-
tion involved in the psychiatric report has as its source only one
informant-the psychiatrist. The presentence report, however,
contains information from various sources and on many different
facets of the defendant. Thus the right to cross-examine each
informant about every statement he made to the probation officer
would entail substantially more delay than extending the right to
cross-examine one psychiatrist.
Another argument against the necessity of disclosing the
psychiatric data to the defendant is that the psychiatrist is an
unbiased participant in the proceedings and thus should not be
subjected to the rigors of an adversary proceeding. 72 But this
view is unpersuasive for a number of reasons. First, even if the
psychiatrist is without bias, this does not negate the possibility
of a mistake in the report, nor does it remedy any of the problems
with regard to possible inadequacies in the report. But beyond
this, a number of commentators have sharply questioned whether
court appointed psychiatrists are in fact unbiased. One writer
suggests that to give the psychiatrist such a privileged status is
to make him a "junior judge," but without the corresponding
incentive to be impartial that is found in the judge's duty to
uphold the law.'13 Another writer points to the possibility that
close relationships with the attorneys or the defendant may
hamper the psychiatrist in making an unbiased evaluation. 7 4
A final contention which may be advanced, at least against
170 ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, supra note 84,
commentary § 4.4 at 222-24.
171 Higgins supra note 82.
172 One judge advanced this ar ent with regard to the reason why he did
not require the psychiatrist to give his report in open court and subject to cross-
examination. Interview with Judge Lurie, supra note 47.
173 T. Szasz, LAw, LmERTY, AND PsYCHmATRY 115 (1963).
'74 Diamond & Louisell, supra note 160, at 1344-45.
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requiring the psychiatrist to appear in court, present his report
and be subjected to cross-examination, is the effect which this
procedure may have on the source of psychiatric information.
The allocation of forensic psychiatric resources is a very real
problem. For example, the Massachusetts Court Clinic can see
only about 5% of all defendants who are tried for crimes, 175 and
it is estimated that the psychiatrists spend 82% of their time with
the offenders.1 76 It would seem that both these percentages would
be decreased if the clinic psychiatrists were required to testify in
open court concerning each dispositional examination which they
conducted.
VI. AN ALTERNATivE PROCEDURE
After consideration of the above arguments with regard to the
use of psychiatric information at the dispositional stage of a pro-
ceeding, it would appear the requirements of due process can be
satisfied and the interests of the defendant and society properly
balanced without requiring the psychiatrist to testify in open
court and be subjected to cross-examination.
It is questionable whether a psychiatrist could draft a single
psychiatric report which contained enough information about
methodology, techniques, amount of interview time, the degree
of certainty of the diagnosis, etc. that the defense attorney can
properly evaluate the report and point out to the judge its
weaknesses, if any. Further, there are a number of problems in
using this method. For example, it may unnecessarily protract the
psychiatric report by becoming needlessly bogged down with
what procedure and techniques were employed by the psychi-
atrist. As noted earlier, it is a bit unrealistic to imagine that every
defense attorney is going to have the expertise or energy to
explore what constitutes acceptable psychiatric procedures. 7
Thus, in many instances, such labor of the psychiatrist would be
lost. Also, it seems a bit unrealistic to instruct the psychiatrist to
first examine the patient and write up a report, and then, in the
same report, criticize his own report by stating that "x" school
of thought may have reached a different result.
3.7
5 Russell, supra note 43.
176 Id. at 5.
177 See note 154, supra.
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A better procedure for the use of written psychiatric reports
at disposition would be as follows. The psychiatrist would be
required to write an initial report of his examination. The report
should be designed to illuminate the defendant's personality by
describing "his motives, his inner conflicts, his capacity for self
control, or his latent character assets, and also the question of
his need for psychiatric treatment...."178 The report also should
contain some basic information as to the interview procedure,
such as what unusual techniques, if any, were used, how many
times the doctor saw the defendant, and what factors were
considered most important in arriving at the psychiatrist's recom-
mendation. This report, which it is hoped would be in a form not
harmful to the defendant, would be disclosed to the defendant
and his attorney. Then, after examining the report, the attorney
should be allowed to submit any questions which he has about
the report, the degree of certainty of the diagnosis, the accept-
ability of any techniques used, and even the doctor's cre-
dentials. The psychiatrist would be allowed to submit written
answers to the court. Thus, unless special conditions necessitated,
the psychiatrist would not be forced to testify in open court. It is
stibmitted that this procedure will protect the defendant's right
to due process and also properly balance the rights of the de-
fendant and society.
As stated earlier, the defendant has the right to a procedure
which will insure that he is not sentenced on the basis of inac-
curate information. This is guaranteed by due process. Because
of the unique nature of psychiatric data, the only procedure
which can insure this right is one which allows the defendant an
opportunity to test the accuracy of the psychiatric data by
attacking the report itself. The foregoing procedure will insure
that the defendant has the right to so attack the psychiatric
report.
To be sure, this is not the only procedure which would satisfy
the requirements of due process. If the court is willing to provide
the defendant with an alternative source of psychiatric data
which the defendant may choose, then psychiatric data begins
to look more like the non-psychiatric data contained in the pre-
178 Russell, supra note 50.
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sentence report, and thus probably a mere disclosure of the data
would satisfy due process requirements. Although providing the
defendant with his own psychiatrist is of obvious merit, it would
seem that few courts would be willing to supply the defendant
with the funds for this alternative psychiatric examination. 79
It is further submitted that such a procedure is not necessary, if
a procedure, such as the one discussed above, is adopted whereby
a defendant can protect himself from inaccurate and unsupported
conclusions.1 0
This alternative procedure has merit above and beyond its
satisfaction of due process. It would provide the defendant with
protection from the impregnable psychiatric report while at the
same time allowing the psychiatrist to write his report and answers
in the more relaxed atmosphere of his office. This would better
permit the psychiatrist to present a report which would be
harmless to the defendant. If a psychiatrist is subjected to open
courtroom examination, an inept defense attorney and the doctor's
lack of forensic skills may combine to give the defendant the
shock of "disclosure overdose," which may impair opportunities
for rehabilitation. Further, this procedure would somewhat re-
move the psychiatrist from the harshness of the adversary pr6-
ceeding, which Mr. Chief Justice Burger has referred to as "not
ideally suited to developing an accurate portrait or profile of the
human personality.... " 8' But it would not do this at the sacrifice
of the rights of the defendant.
Also, this procedure would effect an efficient allocation of the
time of the court and the psychiatrist. Since the reports of the
psychiatrist would be written, the actual courtroom time could be
lessened and thus result in a more efficient allocation of the court's
resources. Further, as regards the psychiatrist, this procedure would
help in the efficient allocation of forensic psychiatric resources.
The psychiatrist who is willing to devote time in the administra-
179 Even at the guilt determination stage of a trial the courts have been
exceedingly reluctant to allow the defendant the right to have a second court ap-
pointed psychiatrist. See, e.g., Wynder v. United States, 852 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir.
1965), cert. denied 382 U.S. 999 (1966); Rudd v. United States, 347 F.2d 321
(9th Cir. 1965).
180 As stated earlier, the right to due process must consider the interests of
both the government and the individual. See the discussion at p. 32, supra. To
require the use of two psychiatrists in each sentencing hearing would obviously be
detrimental to the already thin supply of forensic psychiatrists available.
181 Burger, supra note 1, at 6.
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tion of criminal justice should be encouraged to spend as much
time with defendants or patients as possible. To require the
psychiatrist to appear at a proceeding obviously cuts back on the
amount of time he can devote to the diagnosis of other defendants.
Although time would be required to answer the written inquiries
of the defendant's attorney, it would seem that not all attorneys
would submit clarification questions to the psychiatrist. Also,
even if they did, one must remember that travel time and the time
spent waiting to testify would be avoided by the submission of
written reports.
It is submitted that through this procedure the defendant's
right to due process and the interests of society and defendant
can be properly balanced.
VII. CONCLUSION
Psychiatric information seems especially well suited for use
at the dispositional stage of a trial. It can help the sentencing
judge better understand the convicted defendant by describing
his personality, conflicts and psychological problems. But the
use of such information must be subject to a procedure to check
its bias and mistakes. Anything less runs afoul of the require-
ment of due process and fairness.
To be sure there are other procedures which could be adopted,
but after deliberate consideration, this one appears as the most
workable.
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